Recent advancements in radio frequency machine learning (RFML) have demonstrated the use of raw in-phase and quadrature (IQ) samples for multiple spectrum sensing tasks. Yet, deep learning techniques have been shown, in other applications, to be vulnerable to adversarial machine learning (ML) techniques, which seek to craft small perturbations that are added to the input to cause a misclassification. The current work differentiates the threats that adversarial ML poses to RFML systems based on where the attack is executed from: direct access to classifier input, synchronously transmitted over the air (OTA), or asynchronously transmitted from a separate device. Additionally, the current work develops a methodology for evaluating adversarial success in the context of wireless communications, where the primary metric of interest is bit error rate and not human perception, as is the case in image recognition. The methodology is demonstrated using the well known Fast Gradient Sign Method to evaluate the vulnerabilities of raw IQ based Automatic Modulation Classification and concludes RFML is vulnerable to adversarial examples, even in OTA attacks. However, RFML domain specific receiver effects, which would be encountered in an OTA attack, can present significant impairments to adversarial evasion.
While the popularity of RFML has increased, the study of the vulnerabilities of these systems to adversarial machine learning [14] has lagged behind. Adversarial machine learning consists of learning to apply small perturbations to input examples that cause a misclassification. The increased activity in deep learning research in wireless is sure to draw the attention of attackers in this domain, but, is just beginning to be researched [15] , [16] . Adversarial machine learning could be used, in the context of RFML, to disrupt DSA systems through primary user emulation [17] , evade mobile transmitter tracking [18] , or avoid demodulation by confusing an AMC system [2] .
While research thrusts towards adversarial machine learning evasion attacks and defenses in RFML can build off of the large body of literature present in the CV domain, RFML has additional adversarial goals and capabilities beyond those typically considered in CV. Adversarial goals must be split between attacks that have direct, digital, access to the classifier input and physical attacks that originate from separate emitters and thus are realized as electromagnetic energy. While evaluating digital attacks is useful for estimating the vulnerabilities of RFML DNN to adversarial machine learning, they are less realistic because they implicitly assume another exploit has compromised the signal processing chain to provide that access. Physical attacks do not require additional exploits, but, they must generalize over the channel and signal detection effects present between a transmitter and an eavesdropper. Further, these attacks must be characterized against the primary metric of interest, BER, because an adversary may seek to evade an eavesdropping classifier but that is of limited benefit if it also significantly corrupts the transmission to the intended receiver.
The current work consolidates the additional adversarial goals and capabilities present in RFML and proposes a new threat model. Using the well known FGSM [19] , results are presented from multiple example attacks against raw-IQ based AMC in order to draw general conclusions about the current vulnerabilities of RFML systems to adversarial machine learning attacks, specifically to physical attacks that occur OTA. The current work is organized as follows: Section II surveys the related work in this area, Section III presents a consolidated threat model for RFML systems, Section IV describes the methodology for executing and evaluating the adversarial evasion attacks in the context of wireless communications, Section V and VI analyze the attack's effectiveness with direct, digital, access to the classifier input and physical attacks in Fig. 1 . Threat Model for RFML signal classification systems presented in the style of [29] . As the adversary moves to the right in this diagram, the goal of the adversary becomes more difficult. As the adversary moves lower in this diagram, they have decreased knowledge about how and where the eavesdropper is operating. Thus the "easiest" attack would be in the upper left corner and the "hardest" attack would be in the lower right corner. The current work presents results for untargeted misclassification for both a digital and physical attack scenario with full knowledge of the target network architecture and learned parameters. The related work by Sadeghi and Larsson [15] presented an analysis of two untargeted digital attacks against AMC without a channel model applied to the perturbations. One attack assumed perfect knowledge of the target network and the other only assumed knowledge of the entire training dataset. multiple OTA environments respectively, and conclusions are presented in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Threats to machine learning have a wide span in the literature. Causative attacks exert influence over the training process to inject vulnerabilities into the classifier [20] , [21] . Exploratory attacks [14] seek to learn information about the classifier. The current work is primarily concerned with evasion attacks [22] [23] [24] which seek to cause a misclassification at inference time through manipulation of the inputs. Specifically, this work uses the well known FGSM attack, first proposed in [19] for a CV application, as the algorithm for crafting adversarial perturbations due to its low computational complexity; however, the methodology for evaluating the attack effectiveness will hold for all current evasion attacks.
Prior security threats to cognitive signal classifiers have been researched [25] , [26] , yet, the state of the art signal classification systems use deep learning techniques [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] whose vulnerabilities have not been studied extensively in the context of RF. In [16] and [27] , the authors consider adversarial machine learning for intelligently jamming a deep learning enabled transmitter, at transmission time and sensing time, to prevent a transmission. While their work is primarily concerned with preventing transmission, the current work is primarily concerned with enabling transmission while avoiding eavesdroppers and is thus fundamentally different.
The work presented in [15] is the closest analogy to the current work. The authors present a study of evasion attacks against a similar neural network architecture [8] using the RML2016.10A dataset [28] . However, the authors implicitly assume they are able to compromise the eavesdropper's signal processing chain by not considering the effect of the channel on the perturbation signal. Therefore, the work in [15] only considers a digital attack, whereas the current work considers physical attacks as well, which are transmitted OTA.
III. THREAT MODEL FOR RFML
A rich taxonomy already exists for describing threat models for adversarial machine learning in the context of CV; however, threat models which only consider CV applications lack adversarial goals and capabilities that are unique to RFML. Therefore, the current work extends the threat model initially proposed in [29] for RFML in Figure 1 . This section first describes the system model considered for AMC and then expands on the unique categories of adversarial goals and capabilities that must be considered when discussing adversarial threats to RFML systems.
A. Automatic Modulation Classification System Model
The current work considers the task of blind signal classification where an eavesdropper attempts to detect a signal in the spectrum, isolate it in time and frequency, and perform modulation classification. This task assumes that the signal is a wireless communication between a transmitter and a cooperative receiver where the eavesdropper is not synchronized and has very limited a priori information about the communication. Ultimately, the eavesdropper could then use the output for DSA, signals intelligence, and/or as a preliminary step to demodulating the signal and extracting the actual information transmitted. The current work studies the effectiveness of an adversarial transmitter that seeks to evade classification while maintaining the ability to communicate. Evading an eavesdropper can limit tracking of the transmitter or automatic demodulation of its transmission, but, is a secondary goal to transmitting information to the intended receiver. An overview of a physical evasion attack is provided in Figure 2 . 
B. Adversarial Goals
Three main goals are traditionally considered for adversarial machine learning [29] : confidence reduction, untargeted misclassification, and targeted misclassification. Confidence reduction is the easiest goal an adversary can have. It simply refers to introducing uncertainty into the classifier's decision even if it ultimately determines the class of signal correctly. An adversary whose goal is simply to be classified as any other signal type than its true class, can be described as untargeted misclassification. Targeted misclassification is typically the most difficult goal of adversarial machine learning. It occurs when an adversary desires a classifier to output a specific target class instead of simply any class that is not the true class. Due to the hierarchical nature of human engineered modulations, the difficulty of targeted misclassification for AMC depends heavily on the signal formats of the true and target class.
Further, the current work categorizes adversarial goals based on where the attack is launched from.
1) Digital Attacks: Traditional adversarial machine learning, such as those generally considered in CV or the attack considered in [15] , fall into the digital attack category. This category of attack is performed "at the eavesdropper" as part of their signal processing chain. Therefore, the propagation channel and receiver effects for the example is known at the time of crafting the perturbation, the perturbation is not subjected to any receiver effects, and the perturbation will have no effect on the intended receiver because it is not sent OTA. Attacks at this level are very useful for characterizing the worst case vulnerabilities of a classifier but they are less realistic in the context of RFML because it assumes that the signal processing chain has been compromised.
2) Physical Attacks: When the adversarial perturbation is added at the transmitter and propagates along with the transmitted signal to the eavesdropper, this can be categorized as a physical attack. By adding the perturbation at the transmitter, the perturbation can still be completely synchronous with, and conditioned on, the signal transmission; however, the perturbation will now be subjected to all of the receiver effects traditionally considered in RFML and will also impact the intended receiver. While many of the algorithms that are successful for the digital category of attacks will be applicable to physical attacks, the evaluation of adversarial success must take into account the receiver effects present at the eavesdropper as well as balance this goal of deception with the goal of communication to an intended receiver.
3) Cover: RFML allows for a third category of adversarial goals, in which the adversarial perturbation originates from a separate emitter from the transmitter and is only combined at the eavesdropping device. Low cost transmitters can be SWaP constrained. Therefore, it may be beneficial to have a single unit provide cover for multiple SWaP constrained nodes. However, the perturbations originating from a seperate emitter cannot rely on synchronization with the underlying transmission or knowledge of the specific data stream transmitted; thus, this category of attack is more difficult than the traditional physical attack mentioned previously. The current work does not present a study of this category of adversarial goal and leaves that to future work.
C. Adversarial Capabilities
Traditional adversarial machine learning capabilities, such as those described in [29] , generally help with determining "what you want a classifier to see" by providing information about the target DNN that can subsequently be used to optimize the input. In the most extreme case, attacks may have perfect knowledge of the learned parameters of the model. These attacks are commonly referred to as white-box in other literature. In a very limited case, the attacker may only have access to what is deemed an oracle, an entity that will label a limited number of X, Y pairs for the attacker through an API [30] or an observable wireless transmission [16] , [27] . This allows the attacker to perform limited probes against the target network in order to build up an attack.
Adversarial RFML has a different class of capabilities an attacker can possess that can be thought of as "the ability to make a classifier see a specific example". RF propagation can be directed through the use of smart antennas. Therefore, if a transmitter knew the location of the receiver, it could direct its energy only at the receiver, thus minimizing the SNR at the eavesdropper. Similarly, an emitter providing cover could direct energy only at the eavesdropper, maximizing the impact of perturbations on classification accuracy while minimizing the impact to the receiver.
Signal processing chains can present an impediment to adversarial success. Traditionally, RF front ends are built to reject out of band interference and therefore adversarial perturbations consisting of high frequencies could be filtered out. Power amplifiers can exhibit non-linear characteristics which would distort the perturbation. The precision of the analog to digital converter could limit the attack to stair stepped ranges. Further, current RFML signal classification systems are traditionally accompanied by a signal detection and isolation stage (shown in Figure 2 ), which brings signals down to baseband and isolates them before subsequent classification. Perturbations applied to the signal, especially those that affect the bandwidth of the signal, will have cascading impacts on this portion of a RFML system as well that must be accounted for.
D. Threat Model Assumed in the Current Work
The current work assumes perfect knowledge of the learned parameters of the target DNN and sets the goal as untargeted misclassification. The current work considers perturbations that are specific to the underlying transmitted signal and characterizes their effectiveness in the presence of multiple channel and signal detection effects. Therefore, both digital and physical attacks are considered. The current work does not assume knowledge of either the eavesdropper or receiver locations and therefore does not consider directional antennas and instead shows results across varying SNR ranges. Further, the current work assumes that the receiver is fixed and thus does not introduce any modifications to the receive chain. The receiver is assumed to be synchronized and this synchronization is assumed not to be impacted by the perturbation. Similarly, while multiple effects are modeled at the eavesdropper, these effects are assumed to occur through standard operation of a RFML system and not incurred as a specific reaction to the perturbation being added to the signal.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Most raw-IQ based signal classifiers seek to take in a signal snapshot, x, and output the most probable class y. Traditionally, x would represent a single channel of complex samples, with little pre-processing performed, and could therefore be represented as a two-dimensional matrix [IQ, number of samples]. Specifically, RFML systems, which generally use DNN, learn a mapping from the data by solving
where x and y represent the training inputs and target labels respectively and f represents the chosen network architecture. A loss function (L), such as categorical cross entropy, is generally used in conjunction with an optimizer, such as stochastic gradient descent or Adam [31] , to train the DNN and thus learn the network parameters θ . While training the model, the dataset is fixed (assuming no data augmentation) and is assumed to be sampled from the same distribution that will be seen during operation of the RFML system. Untargeted adversarial machine learning is simply the inverse of this process. By seeking to maximize the same loss function, an adversary can decrease the accuracy of a system. Therefore, the adversary is also solving an optimization problem that can be defined by
In this case, the parameters, θ , of the classifier are fixed but the input, x * , can be manipulated. Many approaches exist to solve this problem. In particular, FGSM [19] creates untargeted adversarial examples using where y represents the true input label and ∇ x represents the gradient of the loss function with respect to the original input, x. This methodology creates adversarial examples constrained by a distance, , in the feature space in a single step. x * is referred to as an adversarial example. One adversarial example used in the current work is presented in Figure 3 , where the source modulation is BPSK and a perturbation has been applied to achieve untargeted evasion for a digital attack.
A. Adapting FGSM
In the context of wireless communications, the absolute value of the signal is generally less important than the relative power of the signal with respect to some other signal such as noise. Therefore, similar to [15] , the current work reformulates the perturbation constraint, , from a distance bounding in the feature space to a bounding of power ratios.
Since the input of sign(∇ x ) in (3) is complex, the output is also complex, and is therefore a vector whose values are (±1, ±1 j ). Therefore, the magnitude of each sample of the jamming signal can be computed as | ± 1 ± 1 j | which is √ 2. Thus, the energy per symbol of sign(∇ x ) can be computed through I × √ 2 where I represents the interpolation factor, or the samples per symbol. Because I is fixed throughout transmission, a closed form linear scaling factor, , can be derived to achieve the desired signal-to-perturbation ratio (E s /E p ) by using
Plugging into (3) allows the creation of adversarial examples constrained by E s /E p and can be succinctly defined as
Constraining the power ratio in this way can be useful for evaluating system design trade-offs. Any given transmitter has a fixed power budget and the current work considers an adversarial machine learning technique which is not aware of the underlying signal format; therefore, power which is used for the perturbation signal subsequently cannot be used for the underlying transmission. Future adversarial machine learning techniques could take into account BER in their methodology which would allow for this energy to accomplish both purposes, but, this exploration is left to future work.
B. Simulation Environment
The high level overview of the simulation environment used in the current work is shown in Figure 4 and each major block is described below. Full evaluation in the context of wireless communications requires the interfacing of both a DSP and ML framework. The current work uses GNU Radio and PyTorch respectively; however, the methodology is not dependent upon use of those frameworks in any way.
1) Modulation: The initial modulated signal is generated by a simple flow graph in GNU Radio. Unless otherwise stated, the parameters for transmission can be summarized as follows. The symbol constellations used are BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, and QAM16. The root raised cosine filter interpolates to 8 samples per symbol using a filter span of 8 symbols and a roll-off factor of 0.35. 1000 examples per modulation scheme are created using a random bit stream.
2) Adversarial ML: In order to craft the perturbation signal using adversarial machine learning techniques it is necessary to first slice the signal into discrete examples matching the DNN input size. Before feeding these examples into the DNN, dithering is employed to add small amounts of noise to the examples. The FGSM algorithm is then used to create the perturbations which are concatenated back together to form the perturbation signal. For each E s /E p studied, the perturbation signal is scaled linearly using (4) and added to the modulated signal. Unless otherwise stated, E s /E p is swept from 0 to 20 dB with a step size of 4 dB.
3) Channel Model: Much of the current work considers a simple channel model with AWGN and center frequency offsets. The received signal can be characterized as
where f o is the normalized frequency offset and σ 2 is given by the desired SNR (E s /N 0 ). The transmitted and received signals are represented by s tx and s rx respectively. Section VI-E considers the same dynamic channel model used in [28] which consists of fading, sample rate offsets, center frequency offsets, and AWGN. The channel models are again implemented using GNU Radio flow graphs.
4) Demodulation:
Demodulating the received signal consists of matched filtering, down-sampling to one sample per symbol, and decoding the symbols back into a bit stream to verify the data received matches the data transmitted. The demodulation is also implemented as a GNU Radio flow graph and assumes both symbol and frame synchronization.
5) Automatic Modulation Classification Evaluation:
Top-1 accuracy is the metric used for classifier evaluation in [8] , [9] , and [32] and is the metric we use for evaluation in the current work. For untargeted adversarial machine learning, adversarial success is simply defined as a lower Top-1 accuracy.
C. Automatic Modulation Classification Target Network
1) Network Architecture: The current work uses the network architecture first introduced in [8] for raw-IQ modulation classification. This architecture consists of two convolutional layers followed by two fully connected layers. This network takes the IQ samples as a [1, 2, N] tensor which corresponds to 1 channel, IQ, and N input samples. The current work uses extended filter sizes as done in [9] and [32] , using filters with 7 taps and padded with 3 zeros on either side. The first convolutional layer has 256 channels, or kernels, and filters I and Q separately. The first layer does not use a bias term as this led to vanishing gradients during our training. The second layer consists of 80 channels and filters the I and Q samples together using a two-dimensional real convolution. This layer includes a bias term. The feature maps are then flattened and fed into two fully connected layers, the first consisting of 256 neurons and the second consisting of the number of output classes. All layers use ReLU as the activation function (except for the output layer). As a pre-processing step, the average power of each input is normalized to 1.
2) Dataset A: The majority of this work uses the open source RML2016.10A dataset introduced in [28] . This synthetic dataset consists of 11 modulation types: BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, CPFSK, GFSK, PAM4, QAM16, QAM64, AM-SSB, AM-DSB, and WBFM. These signals are created inside of GNU Radio and passed through a dynamic channel model to create sample signals at SNRs ranging from −20dB to 18dB with effects including fading, sample rate offsets, and center frequency offsets.
Using an open source dataset allows for quick comparison of results to those seen in literature; however, this dataset contains limited center frequency offsets that are meant to model imperfections in hardware and not errors in the signal detection and isolation stage [32] . Therefore, it was necessary to create an additional dataset to perform all of the evaluations contained in the current work.
3) Dataset B: This additional dataset was also created using synthetic data from GNU Radio and consists of 5 modulation schemes: BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, QAM16, and QAM64. Keeping with the RML2016.10A dataset, the input size was kept as 128 complex samples. The samples per symbol of the root raised cosine filter were fixed at 8. The one sided filter span in symbols is varied uniformly from 7 to 10 with a step size of 1. The roll-off factor of the root raised cosine was varied uniformly from 0.34 to 0.36 with a step size of 0.01. For the channel model, the modulated signal was subjected to AWGN and given a center frequency offset as described by (6) to simulate errors in the receiver's signal detection stage [32] . The power of the AWGN is calculated using E s /N o and varied uniformly from 0 dB to 20 dB with a step size of 2. The center frequency offset, which was normalized to the sample rate, is swept uniformly from −1% to 1% with a step size of 0.2%.
4) Training Results:
The network is implemented in PyTorch and trained using an NVIDIA 1080 GPU with the Adam [31] optimizer. The batch size used is 1024 when the network is trained with Dataset A and 512 when trained with Dataset B. Models trained on Dataset A use dropout for regularization, as was initially proposed in [8] ; however, models trained on Dataset B use Batch Normalization as this increased training stability for the larger example sizes. For all models, the learning rate is set to 0.001 and early stopping is employed with a patience of 5. During training, 30% of the dataset was withheld as a test set. The remaining 70% of the data is used in the training sequence with 5% of the training set used as a validation set. All data is split randomly with the exception that modulation classes and SNR are kept balanced for all sets.
V. ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ATTACKS

A. Baseline Evaluation
In order to first characterize the effectiveness of adversarial machine learning on raw-IQ based AMC, a baseline study of average classification accuracy against E s /E p was performed using the model trained on Dataset A. This attack was performed with no noise added to the adversarial examples and thus assumes digital access to the classifier input.
As can be seen in Figure 5 , even at 30 dB, the FGSM attack is more effective than simply adding Gaussian noise (AWGN). At 10 dB, the FGSM attack is effective enough to degrade the classifier below the performance of random guessing. This represents an 8 dB improvement over the same degradation using Gaussian noise.
B. Analyzing Individual Adversarial Examples
While the previous subsection presented macro-level results, this subsection presents results at a micro-level by analyzing 1) Difference in Logits: While the full output of DNN provides ample information, it is multi-dimensional and therefore hard to visualize. One metric that is often used is a confusion matrix, which captures the relationships among classes. However, confusion matrices are generally only presented as an average across multiple examples and do not provide any notion of the confidence with which a classifier made the prediction. Therefore, a confusion matrix would not fully capture the variance of the DNN because the outputs would not change unless the input examples were moved across a decision boundary. Another metric that could be used is to apply the softmax function to the output and report the confidence associated with the source class. This metric shows the variance of the classifier output but does not provide any indication of the Top-1 accuracy score because even a low confidence output could still be the highest and therefore the predicted class.
The current work presents an additional metric, which we term the "difference in logits" ( logits ), that simultaneously captures the accuracy of the classifier as well as the variance in outputs. "Logits" refers to the DNN output before the softmax function has been applied. The maximum output of all incorrect classes is subtracted from the source (true) class output, which can be described by logits = y s − max(y i ∀i = s)
The difference in logits can be visualized as the shaded region in the top of Figures 6 and 8 . When logits is positive, the example is correctly classified and a negative logits therefore indicates untargeted adversarial success. 
2) Classifier Output Versus E s /E p :
The output of the classifier for the BPSK example, across multiple E s /E p is shown in Figure 6 . At an E s /E p of 10 dB, the attack intensity present in Figure 3 , untargeted misclassification is achieved because the BPSK output is not the highest output of the classifier; this result is also indicated by viewing that logits is negative. However, even though misclassification is achieved, the signal is still classified as a linearly modulated signal, with the predicted modulation order increasing as E p increased. Linearly modulated signals have symbols which exist in the IQ plane (distinguished as solid lines in Figure 6 ) versus a FSK or continuous signal (distinguished as dashed lines) whose symbols exist in the frequency domain or do not have discrete symbols at all, respectively. Therefore, while the adversarial machine learning method was able to achieve untargeted misclassification by causing the classifier to misinterpret the specific linearly modulated signal, the classifier still captured the hierarchical family of the human-engineered modulation. This reinforces the natural notion that the difficulty of targeted adversarial machine learning varies based on the specific source and target modulations used. Figure 8 shows the output of the classifier for a single QAM16 example. As was observed in Figure 6 , at very low E s /E p , where the attack intensity is the highest, the example is again classified as QAM (though untargeted misclassification is narrowly achieved because the model believes it is QAM64). Further, the QAM16 example required much lower energy (E s /E p < 30 dB) than the BPSK example (E s /E p < 15 dB) to achieve untargeted misclassification. Therefore, increasing the perturbation energy does not always provide advantageous effects from the evasion perspective, as can be observed from the difference in logits of Figure 8 , and the optimal attack intensity varies between source modulations.
3) Mutation Testing With AWGN: Mutation testing was proposed as a defense in [33] where the authors repeatedly applied domain specific noise to a machine learning example and calculated the input's sensitivity, with respect to the classifier output, in the presence of this noise. The authors of [33] found that adversarial examples were more sensitive to noise than examples contained in the initial training distribution and therefore mutation testing could be used to detect adversarial examples.
The current work presents a study of the effect of AWGN, one of the most prevalent models of noise in RFML, on individual adversarial examples. For each E s /E p , AWGN is introduced to the signal at varying E s /N 0 (SNR). E s /N 0 is swept from 20 to 0 dB with a step size of 1 dB. For each of the SNRs considered, 1000 trials are performed. While E s /E p and E s /N 0 are the parameters swept in this experiment, the perturbation-to-noise ratio (E p /N 0 ) can be quickly inferred by
Again, results are presented in Figure 7 from the BPSK example originally shown in Figure 3 , where E s /E p is 10 dB. The mean of the difference in logits is shown with the 25th and 75th percentiles shaded to show the variance in the output of the classifier at each SNR. With even a small amount of noise (E s /N 0 of 17 dB) the 75th percentile of the difference in logits becomes positive indicating that the example was classified correctly in some iterations. Increasing the noise power to roughly half that of the applied perturbation (E p /N 0 of 3 dB) results in the classification, on average, being correct.
This effect was not observed across all adversarial examples tested. In Figure 9 it is shown that, while the increased sensitivity of the classifier output is observed in the same range of E p /N 0 , it does not result in a correct classification. Therefore, while [33] presented general conclusions that all adversarial examples were sensitive to noise, these results indicate that this effect is most pronounced when the adversarial perturbation and noise have similar power. However, it is clear that the introduction of AWGN can have significant impacts on the DNN output variance and can even result in the correct classification of an adversarial example.
This section has shown a baseline result that deep learning based raw-IQ AMC is vulnerable to untargeted adversarial examples; however, noise can have a negative impact on adversarial success. Therefore, attacks which can only provide a stochastic input to the classifier (physical attacks) must be evaluated differently than attacks that are able to provide a deterministic input to the classifier (digital attacks) and thus the following section presents a more detailed study of physical attacks using the same adversarial machine learning method.
VI. ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL ATTACKS
All OTA attacks must consider the impact of receiver effects on adversarial success; furthermore, physical attacks must balance the secondary goal of evading an adversary with the primary goal of transmitting information across a wireless channel. Neither of these effects have been considered in prior work and therefore, while the previous section studied adversarial success in near perfect conditions, this section studies the impact to adversarial success when the examples are evaluated in the presence of multiple channel and signal detection effects that would likely occur in a real physical attack and studies the impact to the BER of an intended receiver when the signal is perturbed at the transmitter.
A. Impact to Intended Receiver
In some cases, such as in "rubbish examples" [19] or "fooling images" [34] , the primary goal of adversarial machine learning may simply be to create an input that is classified with high confidence as some target class starting from a noise input. However, in general, fooling a classifier is a secondary goal that must be balanced against the primary objective. In CV, this primary objective is to preserve human perception of the image. In the current work, the primary objective of is to transmit information to a friendly receiver using a known modulation while the secondary objective is to avoid recognition of that modulation scheme by an eavesdropper. In order to study the impact to the intended receiver, a large scale study of BER in AWGN is performed.
Using the model trained on Dataset A, a range of E s /N 0 and E s /E j are considered. For each E s /N 0 considered, ten thousand trials are executed to provide averaging of the random variables present in the channel model for a given random signal. The current work considers both the BER and classification accuracy (which will be discussed in Section VI-B) for BPSK in Figure 10 and 8PSK in Figure 11 .
In order to perform this evaluation, synchronization between the transmitter and receiver is assumed. While it is likely that the perturbation applied will have an impact to the receiver's ability to synchronize, that exploration is left to future work.
As can be seen in Figure 10 , with a BPSK source modulation, even high intensity attacks, such as E s /E p of 8 or 4 dB, have modest increases in the BER of the receiver with less than a 5 dB SNR increase required to maintain the same BER in all attacks except 0 dB. However, as the modulation order increases, the impact of the perturbation on the BER of the intended receiver, unsurprisingly, becomes more severe. This can be clearly seen in Figure 11 for 8PSK. More troubling is that, for 8PSK and QAM16 attacks with E s /E p ≤ 8 dB, and a QPSK attack with a E s /E p of 0 dB, the transmissions already contain bit errors without any added noise and therefore would require forward error correction during operation of the system. Specifically, 8PSK has a BER of ≈ 8% and ≈ 15% when E s /E p is 4 and 0 dB respectively even when there is no additive noise.
While this subsection has shown the impact of adding a perturbation on the signal to the intended receiver, as mentioned previously, adversarial evasion attacks in the context of wireless communications involves balancing this ability to communicate with the ability to deceive eavesdroppers. Therefore, the remainder of the current work focuses on determining the ability of adversarial machine learning to generalize over multiple channel and signal detection effects in order to successfully evade classification in an OTA environment.
B. Additive White Gaussian Noise
As discussed in Section V-B.3, AWGN can have a negative effect on adversarial success. This section further discusses these negative effects with a larger scale study using Figures 10 and 11 previously introduced for BPSK and 8PSK respectively.
Unsurprisingly, increasing the adversarial perturbation energy has positive effects on adversarial success rates (also shown previously in Section V), but, the negative impact of AWGN on adversarial success observed in Figure 7 generalizes across multiple examples. This can be seen clearly in Figure 10 where the accuracy increases by ≈ 20% for the attacks at E s /E p of 12 and 8 dB (red and green lines respectively). This effect can also be observed, to a lesser extent, in the results of 8PSK (Figure 11) . Additional experiments showed that increased accuracy at lower SNRs is also observed for QAM16, but, this can't be confirmed to be a limitation of adversarial attacks because the model, in general, had a higher classification accuracy of QAM16 at lower SNRs and was therefore biased towards that class at these SNRs. Further, the increased accuracy at lower SNRs was not observed for QPSK. However, its clear that AWGN can present significant impediments to evading signal classification and is an effect that would absolutely be encountered in any real system.
In order to directly compare the trade space between evading signal classification and communicating information across a range of SNRs, BER versus classification accuracy is plotted in Figures 10 and 11 for each E s /E p considered. At high SNR, extremely low probabilities of bit error, such as those seen in BPSK at E s /N 0 = 20 dB, are hard to characterize empirically. Therefore, in the BER versus classification accuracy plots, all results with lower than 10 −6 BER have been omitted for clarity. From these plots it is clear that adversarial machine learning provides a benefit to the adversarial transmitter because, for a given BER, classification accuracy can be greatly reduced. However, avoiding signal classification may require sacrificing spectral efficiency or increasing transmission power to maintain the same bit error rate. Specifically, while a BPSK signal can completely evade signal classification in an AWGN channel (by reducing classification accuracy to ≈ 0% across all SNR ranges), higher order modulations such as 8PSK can only achieve the same goal by transmitting a signal that contains bit errors, even without noise, and therefore would require forward error correction for successful operation.
C. Frequency Offset
AWGN is not the only source of noise in a RFML system. Signal classification systems typically do not know when and where a transmission will occur. Therefore, they must take in a wideband signal, detect the frequency bins of the signals present, as well as the start and stop times of transmission, and bring those signals down to baseband for further classification. However, this process is not without error. One effect shown in [32] was the consequences of errors in center frequency estimation, resulting in frequency offset signals. The authors of [32] found that raw-IQ based AMC only generalized over the training distribution it was provided and therefore if additional frequency offsets outside of the training distribution were encountered, the classification accuracy would suffer. Because these estimations are never exact, adversarial examples transmitted OTA must also generalize over these effects.
In order to evaluate the impact of center frequency offsets to adversarial examples, it is necessary to use a model that has been trained to generalize over these effects. Therefore, this experiment uses Dataset B, which has a training distribution consisting of ±1% frequency offsets,which have been normalized to the sample rate. The frequency offsets are swept between −2.5% and 2.5% with a step size of 0.1%. E s /N 0 is evaluated at 10 and 20 dB. At each SNR, 100 trials are performed to average out the effects of the stochastic process. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 12 .
It can be observed that the baseline classifier has learned to generalize over the effects of frequency offsets within its training range of ±1%; however, the adversarial examples are classified with ≈ 10% higher accuracy even at the lowest evaluated frequency offsets of ±0.1%. This effect is observed at both 20 and 10 dB SNR. Therefore, even minute errors in center frequency estimation can have negative effects on adversarial machine learning and must be considered.
D. Time Offset
An additional effect that could be encountered is sample time offsets. In the context of communications, sample time offsets can be thought of as a rectangular windowing function, used for creating discrete machine learning examples, not aligning between the adversarial perturbation crafting and signal classification. As previously mentioned, the signal classification system must estimate the start and stop times of a transmission; one way to estimate these times is to use an energy detection algorithm where the power of a frequency range is integrated over time and then thresholded to provide a binary indication of whether a signal is present. A low threshold could have a high false alarm rate and a high threshold could induce a lag in the estimation of the start time. Furthermore, signal classification systems could use overlapping windows for subsequent classifications to increase accuracy through the averaging of multiple classifications of different "views" of a signal or use non-consecutive windows due to real-time computation constraints. Therefore, this effect is a near certainty.
This experiment uses the model trained on Dataset A and again evaluates the effect at an E s /N 0 of 10 and 20 dB. At each SNR, 100 trials are performed. The time offset is modeled as a shift in the starting index used when slicing the signal for evaluating the signal classification performance and non-overlapping/consecutive windows are still used. The time offset was swept from 0 to 127 (because the input size is 128 and this effect is periodic in the input size); however, only the results from 0 to 10 are shown for simplicity. Time offsets higher than 8 samples, the symbol period, did not present any significant additional impairments beyond those seen at 8. The results are shown in Figure 13 .
As expected, the network is not heavily effected in the baseline case. However, the adversarial examples can be significantly impacted. In the case of an E s /E p of 12 dB, simply shifting the time window to the right by four samples can increase the classification accuracy by ≈ 20%. While some adversarial perturbations have been shown to be agnostic to these time shifts, such as the UAP [22] attack considered in [15] , all evaluations of adversarial machine learning in the context of RFML, that seek to model OTA attacks, must assume this effect exists and generalize over it.
E. Dynamic Channel Model
Previous subsections have incrementally shown the impacts of specific channel and signal detection effects on adversarial success. While this isolation is useful for studying the impact of each specific effect on evading signal classification, it does not provide a holistic view of the success that current adversarial machine learning methodologies would have in a physical attack on a RFML system. Therefore, this subsection presents a final experiment with a more comprehensive channel model. This channel model incorporates AWGN, includes minimal center frequency offsets meant to model hardware imperfections (as opposed to the center frequency offsets used in Figure 9 ), and includes a random sample time offset sampled from U (0, 8); thus, it incorporates all of the channel and signal detection effects previously discussed. Additionally, this channel introduces multi-path fading and sample rate offsets in order to more closely simulate a real system. Note that this dynamic channel model is the same one used for the generation of Dataset A [28] and is therefore the training dataset used for this experiment. The results of evading signal classification are presented in Figures 14 and 15 for BPSK and 8PSK respectively.
As expected, this harsher channel model negatively impacts the signal classification performance in the baseline case; however, it also negatively impacts adversarial success as well. Specifically, while a BPSK signal ( Figure 14) with an adversarial perturbation with E s /E p of 8 dB would achieve near 0% classification accuracy at high SNR using an AWGN channel model (Figure 10 ), the classification accuracy in this dynamic channel model approaches 50% at high SNR. This huge impact to adversarial success is not as pronounced for 8PSK ( Figure 15 ) where a 30% improvement in classification accuracy is observed in the same range. While this is a large difference in classification accuracy between Figures 15 and 11 , it reinforces the results shown in Figures 12 and 13 and is therefore less surprising. Although the negative impacts of this dynamic channel model can be generalized over by simply increasing the perturbation energy, that will further increase the degradation in communications required to achieve evasion of signal classification (as discussed in Section VI-A). 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The current work concludes that adversarial machine learning is a credible and evolving threat to RFML systems that must be considered in future research. However, while the current work has reinforced the conclusions of [15] , that adversarial machine learning is extremely effective when an adversary has direct, digital, access to the classifier's input, it has shown that these vulnerabilities are greatly mitigated when the adversary cannot assume to have compromised the signal processing chain and thus must transmit the perturbation OTA in a physical attack. Specifically, the current work has shown that the perturbation must overcome the noise power in an AWGN channel for maximum effectiveness. It has further shown that center frequency offsets and simple time shifts can negatively impact adversarial success. Considered holistically, an adversarial transmitter must greatly increase the perturbation power, over the power needed for a digital attack, to generalize across these effects that would occur in a physical attack, which is transmitted OTA. The current work has shown that while a low order modulation such as BPSK can tolerate such a perturbation on its signal and still maintain communications, higher order modulations such as 8PSK would require forward error correction for attacks at higher intensity to be feasible. Thus, while signal classification can be evaded with current adversarial machine learning methodologies, such as the FGSM algorithm, it requires sacrificing spectral efficiency or increasing transmission power to achieve similar BER.
In order to perform the evaluations contained in the current work, the components of the system not under study were assumed to be static and not react to the attack. Thus, while the evaluation of BER assumed that the receiver was synchronized, it did not evaluate the effects of the perturbation on the receiver's ability to maintain that synchronization through the impact of the perturbation on phase-locked loops or automatic gain control. This evaluation is left to future work. Further, the current work assumed that the signal detection and isolation stage matched that considered by the RML2016.10A dataset [28] , which was eight times oversampled, and, while effects were modeled as described in [32] , the signal detection and isolation stage was not assumed to react specifically to the perturbations crafted in the current work. Evaluating the adversarial success when other signal detection and isolation stages, which do not greatly oversample the signal, as well as the cascading impact that the has perturbation on these stages is left to future work. Furthermore, the adversarial methodology used in the current work did not consider the underlying communication when crafting the perturbation and thus higher perturbations always resulted in higher BER. However, future work in adversarial RFML will likely jointly consider adversarial success and BER in their methodology and thus create higher power perturbations with lower impact to the underlying communications. Given that the adversary will undoubtedly evolve, RFML systems, which are to be deployed in adversarial environments, must also evolve to harden against these attacks. Dr. Buehrer was named as an IEEE Fellow in 2016 for his contributions to wideband signal processing in communications and geolocation. In 2010, he was a co-recipient of the Fred W. Ellersick MILCOM Award for the best paper in the unclassified technical program. In 2003, he was named as an Outstanding New Assistant Professor by the Virginia Tech College of Engineering. He was a recipient of the Dean's Award for Excellence in Teaching in 2014. He was an Associate Editor of the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOL-OGY, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, and the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EDUCATION. He has also served as a Guest Editor for the special issues of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE and the IEEE JOURNAL OF SELECTED TOPICS IN SIGNAL PROCESSING. He is also an Area Editor of the IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS.
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